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Summary
The digital era has changed employment relationships dramatically, causing a considerable degree
of legal uncertainty as to which rules apply in cyberspace. Technology is transforming business
organisation in a way that makes employees – as subordinate workers – less necessary. New types
of companies, based on the ‘on-demand economy’ or so-called ‘sharing economy’ and dedicated to
connecting customers directly with individual service providers, are emerging. These companies
conduct their entire core business through workers that they classify as self-employed. In this
context, employment law is facing its greatest challenge, as it has to deal with a very different reality
to the one existing when it was created. This article analyses the literature available about the
classification of this new type of worker as an employee or as self-employed, concluding that there
is a need for a new special labour regulation. It also describes and justifies the bases for this new
special labour regulation.
Résumé
L’entrée dans l’ère digitale a entraı̂né des changements considérables dans les relations du travail,
en générant dans une large mesure une incertitude juridique s’agissant des règles qui s’appliquent
dans le cyberespace. La technologie transforme l’organisation de l’entreprise de telle manière que
les employés – en tant que travailleurs subordonnés – apparaissent moins nécessaires. De nou-
veaux types d’entreprises, basées sur « l’économie à la demande », ou sur ce que l’on appelle
« l’économie partagée », et qui entendent relier directement les clients à des prestataires indivi-
duels de service, sont en train d’émerger. Ces entreprises mènent l’ensemble de leurs activités
principales en recourant à des travailleurs qu’elles considèrent comme des travailleurs indé-
pendants. Dans ce contexte, le droit du travail est confronté à son plus grand défi puisqu’il a à
traiter avec une réalité très différente de celle qui existait lorsqu’il a été créé. Cet article analyse la
littérature disponible concernant la classification de ce nouveau type de travailleur comme salarié
ou indépendant, et il conclut à la nécessité d’une nouvelle réglementation spécifique du travail. Il
décrit et justifie également les bases de cette nouvelle réglementation spécifique du travail.
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Das digitale Zeitalter hat zu einer dramatischen Veränderung der Arbeitsbeziehungen und damit zu
einer erheblichen Rechtsunsicherheit in der Frage geführt, welche Regeln im Cyberspace gelten.
Die Technologie verändert Unternehmen in einer Weise, die Arbeitnehmer – als abhängig
Beschäftigte – zunehmend verzichtbar werden lässt. Neue Unternehmen entstehen, die auf der
Basis der ’’On-demand Economy” oder der so genannten ’’Sharing Economy” arbeiten und ihre
Kunden direkt mit den einzelnen Leistungsanbietern in Kontakt bringen wollen. Diese Unter-
nehmen lassen ihr gesamtes Kerngeschäft durch Arbeitnehmer ausführen, die sie als Selbständige
ausgeben. In diesem Kontext sieht sich das Arbeitsrecht vor einer immensen Herausforderung,
denn es muss sich mit einer Wirklichkeit auseinandersetzen, die zum Zeitpunkt seiner Entstehung
in keiner Weise vorauszusehen war. Der Artikel analysiert die verfügbare Literatur über die
Klassifizierung dieses neuen Beschäftigtentypus als Arbeitnehmer oder als Selbständiger und
kommt zu dem Schluss, dass wir ein neues Arbeitsrecht brauchen. Er beschreibt und begründet
ebenfalls die Grundlagen für dieses neue spezielle Arbeitsrecht.
Keywords
Outsourcing, ‘sharing’ economy, employment contract, self-employment, Uber economy, gig
economy, economic dependency, legal concept of employee, gig economy
Introduction: new types of companies and the characteristics of their
business model
The legal concept of an employee is rooted in a pre-Internet era. The advent of the digital era has
changed employment relationships dramatically, causing considerable legal uncertainty about
which rules apply in cyberspace. The first signs came from telework (Gabel and Mansfield,
2003: 304). However, online workers are not the only ones affected. Technology is transforming
business organisations in a way that makes employees – as subordinate workers – less necessary.
New types of companies, based on an ‘on-demand economy’ or ‘sharing economy’ and dedicated
to connecting customers directly with individual service providers, are emerging. These companies
conduct their core business completely through workers classified as self-employed.1 These new
organisational possibilities, enabled by technology, might be the culmination of a process, initiated
some years ago, called ‘the escape from employment law’ (Baylos Grau, 2000: 44).
In the literature, this new business model has been called the ‘gig economy’ or ‘specific offline
crowdwork’. Crowdwork consists of outsourcing work, traditionally carried out by an employee, to
an indefinite and usually large number of people in the form of an open call (Howe, 2006:
176–179). These new technological companies thus, in theory, just match a client (demand) with
a worker who will perform the task (supply). This level of outsourcing would have been impossible
before the arrival of the new technologies. These companies devote their business to building an
online platform (web, apps, etc.) where clients can directly find a worker or workers to perform the
1. This new organisational model has been called the ‘Uber economy’, but also ‘on-demand economy’,
‘sharing economy’, ‘peer-to-peer economy’ or ‘1099 economy’. Each name attempts to emphasise one
characteristic of the new model. Nevertheless, all the new types of companies share one common
characteristic: the existence of an online platform which connects supply and demand. See Brescia
(2016).
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task. As the platform-owning companies claim to be just a database where clients and workers can
find each other, they can classify workers as self-employed. As a result, in the absence of the
application of employment law protection, especially the minimum wage and collective wage
agreements, a client can obtain a service much cheaper than the one provided by traditional
organisations (De Stefano, 2016).
In the tertiary sector, the range of businesses potentially affected is wide. Current examples
include Uber – city transportation; Sandemans – guided tours; FlyCleaners – laundry; Myfixpert –
electronics repairs; Chefly – cooks at home; Helping – housekeeping; Sharing academy – tutor at
home; or Entrenar.me – personal training. As we can see, these examples do not involve telework,
but activities which require local, offline, execution. Moreover, the described companies belong to
a particular sector. A client who uses these platforms is looking for a particular activity related to
the platform brand. These companies do not provide a bulletin board where you could find any type
of activity, but one where you can only find a specific and predefined activity.2 This characteristic
is important because most of the time, the platform, within the specific type, wants to control how
the work is done. As would be expected from a more traditional organisation, the company wants
to keep a high level of quality when it provides its services. The platform thus has to ensure that
workers provide a good service to its clients. Nevertheless, such organisations keep classifying
their workers as independent contractors, or self-employed workers.
The most famous company of the specific offline crowdwork type is Uber. Uber owns a virtual
platform where a user can obtain city transport. Operation is simple. After downloading the Uber
app for free, any user can use it to find, by GPS, the closest driver and ask for a ride. Uber does not
employ drivers or own any cars; on the contrary, Uber expects its participating drivers to do the
job. Potential drivers have to send an application to Uber and pass a test in order to be authorised to
participate in the platform. The authorisation process includes a request to send their driver’s
licence, car registration number and car insurance policy. Depending on the city, drivers may also
be examined on their geographical knowledge of the city and may be interviewed by an Uber
employee. A driver’s vehicle has to be less than 10 years old. The price of the service is not
negotiable, but set by Uber. Tips are forbidden and Uber takes between 10 per cent and 20 per cent
of the price. Users can evaluate drivers and evaluations are made public for other clients (Avi
Asher-Schapiro, 2014). If these are negative, Uber can deactivate a driver’s access to the platform.
Uber can revoke a driver’s access to the platform for other reasons too, e.g. for criticising the
company on social networks (Huet, 2014). Drivers are free to choose when to work and for how
long. Drivers can also refuse rides, but if a task is accepted it has to be completed (Uber, 2016).
Moreover, the ‘drivers’ manual’ provided by Uber says that a driver is expected to accept all jobs.
Uber will investigate – with the possibility of deactivating the driver – if too many rides are
rejected. The manual invites drivers to wear professional clothes, suggests that the radio should
be switched off or, if left on, should play jazz music. It also recommends opening the car door for
users’ convenience (Rogers, 2015: 11) and keeping an umbrella in the car, so that, in the event of
rain, the user does not get wet when entering or exiting the vehicle (O’Connor v. Uber Technol-
ogies, Inc., No C-13-3826 EMC, 2015). The driver has to pay for all running expenses (petrol,
insurance, taxes) and the car, and assumes all responsibility should an accident occur. Uber offers
cut-price insurance to all its drivers.
2. As opposed to generic platforms where you can find any kind of service offered, e.g. TaskRabbit.com or
Gigwalk.com. Here, you can employ workers inter alia for delivery work, assembling furniture,
housework or warehouse audits.
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As outlined above, Uber is just one of many companies that share the same business model.
Acknowledging the characteristics described, we can conclude that the model has the following
characteristics:
1) Less/different labour dependency: The distinctive feature is that the new companies do not
need to manage and supervise work. Using technology, companies will trust clients’ work
evaluation when making dismissal (deactivation) decisions (ex-ante and ex-post control).
In the same sense, companies have no incentive to provide training to workers because if
anyone wants to do a job they need to be sufficiently trained and ready to work. This new
kind of work is configured with less (or different) subordination and more freedom to do
the job. However, we can observe that the platform retains partial control over workers and
the way they are supposed to work. A platform dedicated to one specific activity needs to
maintain a high value image, and therefore it has a huge interest in delivering a high-quality
and standardised service.
2) Economies of scale or the need for a critical mass: The business is based on accumulating a
huge number of workers and users. Indeed, the fact that the platform has a large number of
workers makes it unnecessary for the company to give specific instructions about schedules
or working hours. The company expects clients always to be able to find an available
worker thanks to the large number of them on the platform. This necessity for a critical
mass can lead to a monopoly or oligopoly situation.
3) Global business: Once a platform has been built, expansion of the platform is relatively
easy and cheap, allowing the typical platform to go global and deliver its services all over
the world (Rogers, 2015: 10, 30). Moreover, global expansion enables companies to exploit
economies of scale, thereby allowing a brand to obtain the trust of users around the world.
This makes it easy for the organisation to obtain the critical mass needed.
4) Something more than just a database: One of the key questions, still open to debate, is the
nature of such new companies. There is no agreement on whether they only provide data (as
a database) or whether they are companies providing services in a specific sector.3 In the
first case, if the company owning the platform is considered a technological company that
only provides data to facilitate the matching of supply and demand, it cannot be held
responsible for any problems or damage caused during work. In the same sense, the
company would be under no obligation to comply with any sector regulations.4 Moreover,
it would be difficult to establish an employer-employee relationship between a platform
and a worker who works through this platform. Regarding this question, a US Court ruled
that Uber cannot be considered a technological company because if that were the case Uber
would not intervene in how work is done (O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No C-13-
3826 EMC, 2015). Alongside matching supply and demand, these new types of companies
also require certain behaviour by workers in order to control the quality of the work.
Moreover, these companies’ revenues are not derived from access to their database, but
instead from charging clients for the task (work) performed (Aloisi, 2016: 669). At the end
of the day, consumers do not use these kinds of companies because they have a list of
3. In the click-wrap agreement Uber says that they are not a transportation company, therefore they
disclaim any responsibility for the services provided by the drivers; see Uber Terms and Conditions,
www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms
4. For example, if Uber is considered a technological company, it is under no obligation to comply with taxi
regulations.
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workers who can provide the service needed, but because they want a specific service
provided by a specific platform. This means that a company’s reputation depends on how
well workers do the job. For this reason, platforms will deactivate workers who do not
perform well enough.
The aim of this article is to analyse whether these new types of workers are legally employees or
self-employed, and whether there is a justified need for new special labour regulation protecting
such workers. The article is structured as follows. The first part deals with the problems of using
the right to control to find out whether such workers come under the scope of employment law,
while the second part discusses the necessity for new kinds of protections and proposes specific
regulations. The article ends with some conclusions.
The impact of the new business model on labour relationships
The appearance of this new way of doing business has given rise to two fundamental questions in
the labour market. The first concerns a legal issue, questioning whether the traditional legal
concept of an ‘employee’ is still valid in connection with this new way of working. The second
question concerns policy, questioning whether there is any need to extend the scope of labour
law protection, disconnecting subordinate work from such protection. What also has to be
considered is whether the protection required by new workers is the same (or different) to the
traditional protection accorded to subordinated work. In this sense, a new type of legal protection
may be needed.
The scope of employment contracts and new types of workers
Traditionally, a self-employed worker is considered to be a person who works directly for the
market, i.e. someone who offers his/her services to one or more companies without becoming part
of them. Self-employed people are owners of their own organisation and have the independence
needed to choose whether to accept a task. They own the tools and materials needed for the work
and bear all business risks (Martı́nez Barroso, 2005: 122). New types of workers – working through
an online platform, owning the tools and materials needed for the work, choosing when (schedule
freedom), for how long (freedom of working hours) and whether to perform the work – would
therefore seem to fit more into the self-employed category and less into a traditional employment
relationship. In the past, labour law (in dealing with such new challenges) has expanded the
definition of an ‘employee’ in line with new ways of working (Martı́nez Barroso, 2005: 106).
In this regard, it has been expounded that work, when organised, determined, used and harnessed
by a company, will lead to a classification as an employee even if this person enjoys a certain
degree of autonomy (Rodrı́guez-Piñero, 1999: 21). For this reason, it will be crucial to determine
whether online platform workers somehow remain within the organisational field of a company
and under its control. In the USA and the UK, where the first conflicts have arisen, the literature
and judicial rulings (Employment Tribunals case Mr Y Aslam vs Uber case n 2202550/2015) argue
that these new companies are misclassifying their workers as self-employed.5 However, it is
interesting to note that the UK ruling classifies drivers as ‘workers’ and not as ‘employees’.
(Davidov, 2005: 57–71). The arguments are as follows:
5. In Spain, the Social inspectorate has also sanctioned Uber Systems Spain for misclassification of its
employees: http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2015/06/12/actualidad/1434135569_865496.html
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New forms of control
Traditional ways of monitoring and controlling the quality of work consisted of a set of
elements. Companies would give specific training to an employee and specific instructions
on how to perform work, and they would establish a monitoring system to check whether
instructions were being followed. In these new organisations nothing like this exists.
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the monitoring and control of workers still exists, but in
other forms. In the same sense, when we look at traditional employees in telework we observe that
the traditional right to control is not valid for checking for new forms of dependency in the
relationship. It has been said that in telework we find very different indications of dependency
from the ones found in a Fordism production chain (Rodrı́guez Sañudo, 1999: 104; Selma Penalva,
2010: 24). Online platforms delegate monitoring to clients through an evaluation system. In this
sense, companies do not need to give specific instructions or control the way the work is done to
ensure quality. Instead, they allow clients to evaluate job performance, and may subsequently use
such information to take decisions on dismissals (Benjamine Sachs, 2015). Indeed, even if com-
panies only make suggestions (without giving instructions) about how to do the work, workers not
following these can easily be dismissed. Expecting suggestions to be followed in their own interest,
clients can give bad ratings to non-compliant workers (Aloisi, 2016: 670). The level of monitoring
of these new workers is thus greater than ever, since work is observable at all times (Sprage, 2015:
18) and without cost. In traditional organisation structures, middle managers were costly, so the
objective was to have an optimal level of monitoring. However, monitoring in these new organisa-
tions is now delegated, while monitoring levels are maximised. In short, the absence of a set of
company instructions only means that workers are now submitted to a results obligation and not to
a means obligation. There are other examples of this kind of transformation. When new companies
use co-participation, monitoring focuses on work results, without workers being given any direct
instructions (Rodrı́guez-Piñero, 1999: 37).
The necessary control
Another part of the literature establishes that, even if we acknowledge that there has been a decrease in
dependency, this would not mean that workers have become self-employed. A certain level of freedom
in the way the work is done will not distort the dependency relationship, and even less so when this
freedom is inherent to the work (Sprage, 2015: 15). Thus, the important thing will not be how much
control an employer exercises, but how much control an employer retains the right to exercise. The fact
that online platforms allow workers to choose working hours and schedules (because technology
makes it unnecessary to issue such instructions) does not make workers self-employed. The company
could issue new instructions and workers should obey. For this reason, the fact that organisations
choose not to exercise power as employers does not mean that they do not have it.
In sum, the sole use of necessary instructions does not mean that a worker becomes self-
employed (Rogers, 2015: 13). The key point will be to know whether the employer has established
sufficient instructions to maintain, and with the aim of maintaining, control over a productive
system. The issue is that it is not clear when a company is establishing necessary instructions to
control a process. However, this conception of the employment relationship is highly related to an
imbalance of power and, indeed, unbalanced power will lead to a situation where a company could
choose which instructions to issue.
Unbalanced bargaining power
The literature used to argue that labour law was there to protect the economically weaker party. In
that sense, employment contracts applied to ‘workers’ working in a socio-economic context similar
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to that of ‘employees’ regardless of any subordination (Rodrı́guez-Piñero, 1969: 59–63; González
Ortega, 1987: 278; Davidov, 2002: 357; Davidov, 2005: 62; Davidov, 2016: 35–45). However, of
late, the legal concept of an employment contract has shifted from a social dimension towards a
legal construction which does not take into consideration any reference to an economic, social or
political situation (Rodrı́guez-Piñero, 1999: 24). In such a context, part of the literature supports
the idea that there should be a correlation between the social situation of a ‘worker’ (economic
subordination) and the legal concept of an ‘employee’ (and his/her protection) (Baylos Grau, 2000:
48–49, 105). This way of thinking upholds the concept that an employment relationship should be
applied to any worker who has an objectively weak bargaining position regardless of how he/she
executes the work, albeit under dependency or with autonomy (Rogers, 2015: 14 and 25).
Inclusion in an external organisation
Another part of the literature understands that dependency should not be based on the existence of a
set of direct instructions, but on a worker’s inclusion in an external organisation (employer
organisation) or, to put it another way, on the lack of his/her own organisation (Montoya Melgar,
1998). In this regard, a self-employed person will only be the one whom the company considers
necessary to provide services and who also assumes business risks (Rodrı́guez-Piñero, 1992: 7).
Conversely, when a worker is inside an external organisation where an employer establishes the
rules, he/she would be an employee. Applied to the new business model, this literature leaves few
doubts about the fact that the platform rules the organisation and business practices, while the
worker can either accept the rules or lose his/her work. We are not talking here about the coordina-
tion between a platform and a worker (Martı́n Valverde, 1990: 227), but about a combination of
rules imposed on workers by the company that owns the platform.
A lack of entrepreneurial opportunities
Another argument featured in a large part of the literature and defending the classification of
workers as employees is the inexistence of entrepreneurial opportunities. Workers who work via an
online platform provide their labour without any possibility of entrepreneurial development
(Rogers, 2015: 5). This contrasts with a self-employed contractor who provides experience, train-
ing, knowledge and skills that a company does not have (Sprage, 2015: 15, 19). However, these
new companies provide all their services through self-employed workers, i.e. people who do not
add any special value to the job apart from their labour. Where necessary, know-how is provided
by the company (Luján Alcaraz, 1991: 605–606) and transmitted to workers through ‘recommen-
dations’ or necessary instructions. In fact, the only real advantage of using a self-employed worker
instead of an employee would seem to be the avoidance of paying social security contributions.
This results in a less costly service, although this does not seem to be a valid use of the self-
employed institution, according to the European Commission (Casas Baamonde, 1999). On the
contrary, a self-employed worker is one with fair development opportunities. Real self-employed
workers should have the opportunity to acquire their own clients in order to develop their business
(Sprage, 2015: 10). It is thus inconsistent to classify someone who only offers his/her labour and
does not have any chance of obtaining the profits inherent to a company as a self-employed
entrepreneur (Marvit, 2014).
Irrelevancy of certain signs in order to determine the existence of an employment relationship
Lastly, other legal authorities argue that some evidence is not relevant when deciding whether a
worker is in an employee relationship or self-employed. First, ownership of tools and materials and
acceptance of business risks are a poor sign of subordination. Employment contracts were created
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at a time when the tools and materials needed for production were factories, i.e. employees could
never be owners of the means of production. However, because today the means of production can
be a car or a housekeeping cart, i.e. something anyone can possess, the lack of ownership of means
of production is no longer a good indication of being an employee. Conversely, being their owner
no longer means that you need no protection.
Indeed, in the new business model described above, the real means of production are tech-
nological. Investment in technology to create an online platform is the costly part of the means of
production and, by comparison, the tools and materials owned by a worker are insignificant
(Rogers, 2015: 15). At the end of the day, we have to bear in mind that the elasticity of the
concept of an ‘employee’ has to allow it to adapt to the social reality of the time (Pérez de los
Cobos, 1993: 39).
Problems with fitting these new workers into the legal concept of an ‘employee’
So far, it seems that there are sufficient reasons to classify people performing offline tasks through
a specific online platform as workers (not self-employed). In the UK (Employment tribunal case:
Mr Y Aslam vs Uber case n 2202550/2015) and the USA, several rulings, even of the Supreme
Court (Supreme Court: NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel CO 301. U.S 1, 33–34 (1937)), point in this
direction. The literature argues that the only reason why the employee concept has not been applied
is because of the novelty and misunderstanding of the digital world (Cherry, 2009: 1106; Cherry,
2016). Indeed, in the USA, the idea of applying employment protection to all workers with an
unbalanced power position has been extended (Patrick Cotter v. Lyft 13-cv-04065-VC, Auto
denying the petition to dismiss the case (N.D California March 11, 2015); based on an old pre-
cedent in S.G. Borello & Sons, INC., V. Department of Industrial Relations, 48, California, 3d 341,
351 (1989)). With this purposive interpretation of an employment contract, courts are trying to
protect all workers whose autonomy is diminished (because of the power imbalance) regardless of
whether subordination or dependency is found (Davidov, 2016). Nevertheless, we think this
position in the legal systems of continental Europe could have two problems. On the one hand,
a legal consequence of a court ruling establishing such workers as employees would make it
necessary to apply all the labour rules to them. However, some of these rules just do not fit this
new business model. Courts, faced with this sort of decision, would be unable to choose which
rules would apply or which new solutions could be better.
On the other hand, a solution based on a court ruling would mean that, up to that moment,
companies would have been misclassifying workers as self-employed, i.e. they would be subject to
sanctions and other legal liabilities for breaking the law until that time.
For both reasons, we think it would be better to find a legislative solution. In a matter of legal
policy, there should be an open debate over which kind of protection such workers should enjoy
(Davis, 2015).
A different kind of protection required for a new type of employee
New protection for a new industrial relations model
Even if the employment relationship can be interpreted to fit the new type of workers, this does not
mean that the protection needed by both the new and the old types is the same.
Rules protecting working conditions do not fully match the new business model, one of the main
characteristics of which is working time flexibility. Workers are allowed to choose when and for
how long they wish to work, a concept distant from traditional regulations on working hours,
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schedules, compulsory rest periods and holidays. Fixed salaries and minimum wages seem difficult
to fit into a business model where a worker can also choose how long he/she is going to work
(Fisher, 2015; Weber and Turcios, 2015: 12). Moreover, regulations about a pool of on-call
workers or a preferential right to work in on-call jobs seem incompatible with a business which
lets clients choose a specific worker, as clients will select the worker they prefer based on the
public evaluations. The application of collective bargaining also has its difficulties. Bargaining
entities are hard to establish on an online platform where it is unlikely that the number of workers is
known and they can work for different platforms at the same time (Felstiner 2011: 183–185).
Moreover, in a business where workers do not know each other, mutual trust to agree on union
representatives is doubtful (Beyer, 2014; Salehi et al., 2015: 1621).
Lastly, a company has to pay for any expenses incurred by an employee under current regulations.
However, in a business allowing freedom to the employee (on how to perform the job) this would
seem unfair to the company. Apart from that, this business model relies on underused items owned by
the worker (computer, car, Internet connection, phone, camera, and so on) and so it seems unreason-
able to ask for reimbursement afterwards. However, there are some expenses which arise wholly
from the work for which it might be fair to ask for reimbursement (e.g. a car’s running costs).
Special labour law for employees who work through an online platform
In Spain, Italy and some other legal systems, there are different labour regulations for different
professions. This is known as ‘special labour law’. For example, there are special employee
regulations for high-level managers, sportspeople, salespeople, artistic professions, domestic work
and lawyers, among others. These special labour laws aim to adapt employment regulations to the
specific necessities of a profession. By using this institution it should be simpler to include gig
economy workers within the scope of the employment law, provided that those regulations incom-
patible with this new business model are modified to take account of the latter’s circumstances.
A special labour relationship should be applied to those who perform work offline through a
specific online platform, as described in this article. In this specific work, basic labour rights
should be protected, without impeding the normal development of the industry. More specifically,
the regulations should ensure fair representative procedures to allow self-regulation through col-
lective agreements.
Such regulations should answer some of the following questions, although this is by no means
an exhaustive list:
1) Instructions: In our opinion, the existence of direct instructions to the worker is no longer a
good delimiter of an employment relationship. On the contrary, the new kind of workers,
regardless of whether they receive instructions on how to perform the work or not, deserve
protection (with regard to this discussion see Cruz Villalón, 1999).
To achieve a degree of legal certainty, the law proposed would have as its scope those workers
who perform their activities through an online platform with less dependency (without direct
instructions). This would mean that a platform could only establish the necessary instructions,
leaving workers free to choose how to perform their tasks. Under this scope of application, in the
case of a platform issuing specific instructions, this special labour norm would not be applicable
and would require the application of the traditional employment protections.
Reduced legal dependency, as a characteristic of a special labour contract, is nothing new. The
literature argues that telework is incompatible with a temporal delimitation of work (De la Villa Gil
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and Garcı́a Ninet, 1990). In the same vein, a salesman, high-level manager or performing artist has
less dependency, a characteristic justifying special regulation (Guerrero Vizuete, 2010: 4).
2) Freedom of schedules and working hours: The special regulations should include workers’
freedom to establish their own schedules and working hours, as this is the main feature of
the new industry. Employers, however, should be allowed to set a maximum number of
working hours per worker per week (e.g. choosing whether the company wants a part-time
or full-time worker). At the same time, the regulations should establish an overall maxi-
mum number of working hours regardless of whether they are worked for the same plat-
form or for others. The goal of this maximum would be to encourage work-sharing and
reduce unemployment.
3) Freedom to work on more than one platform: In order to promote freedom of entry into the
market, the regulations should prevent exclusive agreements between one platform and a
worker. Without this prohibition, it would be very easy for existing companies to mono-
polise all workers in a sector, leaving no possibilities for new companies to enter the
market. If every worker can only be on one platform, this would have the effect of reducing
competition and would reduce the chances of finding a worker available for consumers.
4) Employees’ liability for damages: A lack of legal dependency has to imply a lack of
company liability for damages. Traditional employees have no responsibilities in this
respect because they act as a proxy of their employer, merely following his instructions.
However, increased freedom in the way the work can be performed means greater respon-
sibilities. This liability would include damage involving clients, but also damage to the
online platform’s reputation.
5) Minimum wage: One of the most delicate questions is the right to a minimum wage. In a
way of working where a worker can choose when he/she wants to work and for how long,
the existence of a guaranteed minimum wage can be costly for a company. Nonetheless, a
company should pay a minimum wage for time spent working for a client. The contro-
versy lies in waiting times. What happens when a worker is waiting for a client on an
online platform?
An equitable solution could be to consider waiting time as time in which a worker is available to
the company (on-call) but unproductive (mora accipiendi). For example, in Spain the labour law
establishes that the employer always has to pay wages for this kind of unproductive time. However,
a special regulation should qualify this obligation, compelling companies to pay for this unpro-
ductive time. It should be subject to collective bargaining. Thus, a collective agreement could
reduce payment of waiting times to below the minimum wage or even remove the right to wages if
deemed appropriate.
6) Reimbursement of expenses: A special employment law should allow companies to estab-
lish a series of requirements as regards the materials or tools owned by the worker in order
to work via the platform. In this sense, employees could be required to possess a phone, car,
computer, etc. and these ‘under-utilised’ assets should not be paid for by the company.
However, consumable goods needed to perform the work should be reimbursed by the
company (e.g. running costs). Hence, there would be a separation between fixed costs (paid
by the worker) and running costs (paid by the company).
7) Subsidiary labour law: To avoid loopholes, the special norm should refer to the employ-
ment contract regulations for everything not considered by the special rule.
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Conclusions
This research analyses a new business model: a new type of company which claims to be a
database via which supply and demand are matched. The companies argue that they do not have
any control over workers, and therefore they are classified as self-employed. However, in this
article we take a different view. There is no doubt that, on these platforms, workers enjoy more
flexibility in terms of working hours and schedules, and even have more flexibility in the way
they perform tasks. Nonetheless, the literature still considers them to be employees. The opposite
would mean that labour law would be neglecting the subject – workers – which it has tried to
protect since its very origins. Laws have to be interpreted in line with the social context of each
period, making it necessary to find different formulas to continue to provide that a worker who
works for a living is protected.
Nevertheless, we do not consider it appropriate to implement all existing employment contract
regulations in the new business model. A worker who works offline for an online platform is
subject to risks different to those of a traditional employee. Such workers therefore need a tailor-
made regulation. In this article, we propose the creation of a special employment relationship
covering the specific aspects described above. This special regulation should be applied only to
this kind of worker and should be adapted to the specific features of this new industry. This article
presents a draft of this proposed regulation.
Public inaction would mean that new companies are imposing their conditions on the market.
The simple fact that they can act without the costs of applying labour law means that they can
provide services at a lower price than competing companies working to a traditional model.
Thus, the competitive advantages of the new business model are not necessarily the result
of better organisation and greater productivity, but simply of the non-application of employ-
ment standards.
In this sense, the objective pursued by the application of labour standards (a proposed special
employment contract) for this new type of worker will not only protect those who work for a living
(Pérez de los Cobos, 1993: 48), but will also prevent unfair competition and social dumping
(Rodrı́guez-Piñero, 1999: 27). Otherwise, these new companies will monopolise the market,
squeezing out traditional companies.
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del ámbito de aplicación del Derecho del Trabajo. Murcia: Universidad de Murcia.
Luján Alcaraz J (2001) Reflexiones sobre el papel del Derecho del Trabajo en la actual revitalización del
trabajo autónomo. Aranzadi Social 15: 227–234.
204 Transfer 23(2)
Martı́n Valverde A (1990) El discreto retorno del arrendamiento de servicios. In: VVAA Cuestiones actuales
de Derecho del Trabajo. Estudios ofrecidos por los catedráticos de Derecho del Trabajo en homenaje al
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Polı́tica Social 71: 40–73.
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